Russia’s Poisonous Streak
Alexei Navalny is a name Russian President Vladimir Putin rarely dares to pronounce — a phenomenon several organizations including the Guardian have noticed. Dubbed by the Wall Street Journal as “the man Putin fears most”, the opposition leader poses a serious threat to the Russian authorities, evident in their efforts to stop him. The recent attempt on his life with the nerve-agent Novichok calls to mind other instances the Kremlin has resorted to poisoning in the past. Its poisonous streak sheds light on the lengths the Russian government would go to in order to secure its reign.
Navalny, 44, is one of the most outspoken critics of Putin’s regime and a fierce anti-corruption activist. In 2008, he created a blog, where he initially expressed his critique for the lack of transparency in the financing of big oil corporations. He initiated several social projects, aimed to support younger politicians, founded the non-profit organization (NPO) “Anti-Corruption Foundation” and became the leader of the Russia of the Future (Россия Будущего) party in 2018. Navalny’s main political goals have been to “melt away the power” of the “crooks and thieves” ruling the country: fighting against the dictatorship and corruption of Putin’s regime and strengthening the economy. He used his platform and gradually growing social outreach to motivate his followers to vote strategically through his “smart voting” system, which identifies the candidate most likely to defeat Putin’s United Russia in elections.
On August 20th, days before important local elections were due to take place in Siberia, Navalny suddenly went comatose. He stayed in the hospital in Omsk for two days before being transported to Germany, on the grounds that his condition had not been stable enough. The Russian doctors denied finding any poisonous substance in the opposition leader’s body - while German, French and Swedish laboratories later reported traces of the nerve agent Novichok. It is a category of chemical weapons developed by the USSR and only Russian authorities have access to it. This is why its presence, when detected, is a clear sign of involvement by the Kremlin. The latter stood by the Russian doctors’ expertise and claimed that Navalny had not been poisoned.
The assassination attempt on Navalny’s life is the culmination of a series of the Russian government’s efforts to remove the activist from the political scene. Previously, he had been arrested on numerous occasions: for defying authorities in protesting against alleged electoral fraud in 2011, twice for embezzlement, and for encouraging anti-government protests (several times). The latter embezzlement case — deemed by the European Court of Human Rights “arbitrary and unreasonable” — has prevented his candidacy for the 2018 presidential elections. The previous year he was attacked with caustic green dye “Zelyonka”, which left him temporarily blind in his right eye.
The timeline of Navalny’s clashes with the authorities seems to suggest that the Kremlin is not wasting time or resources in reinforcing its dictatorial regime. It is also not the first, nor will it be the last occasion where the Kremlin’s disdain of democratic practices has shown itself. This year marks the start of the third decade of Putin’s incumbency, elongated strategically. After his second mandate as a president ended in 2008, Putin was appointed Prime Minister, de facto retaining his dominance. This allowed him to enter and, consequently, win two more presidential elections, with his second mandate set to end in 2024. Earlier this year the Russian Parliament approved a constitutional change, which removes any restrictions on the length of the incumbent’s term — formally granting Putin time in charge until 2036. This was described by the opposition as a “constitutional coup”, yet they have been powerless to do anything about it: with respect to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, Russia’s level of democracy has hardly progressed since the Soviet Union’s totalitarian regime.
It was namely during Soviet times that the Russian government’s strategy of poisoning its enemies was conceived. In 1978, the KGB (Committee for State Security) assassinated journalist and dissident to the Bulgarian totalitarian regime Georgi Markov. He was poisoned with ricin while on his way to BBC’s headquarters at Bush House. The ’70s also saw the USSR develop a powerful new chemical weapon — Novichok, meaning “newcomer” in Russian. It was designed to be more efficient than VX, the deadliest nerve agent known to the West at the time. Furthermore, in its binary form, the Novichok organophosphates are hard to detect and do not violate the laws introduced to prevent the use of chemical weapons, thereby being technically not illegal.
Novichok made an appearance in the headlines in 2018 with the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. He was a colonel in the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) until 2004 when he was arrested for handing classified information to the British Intelligence Services. The likely cause for his poisoning is the fact that he had been privy to still relevant information on GRU, potentially including data linking it with the Russian mafia. Similar motives can be seen in the poisoning of another ex-agent — Alexander Litvinenko — who accused the FSB of performing acts of terrorism to establish Putin’s authority. In 2006 Litvinenko was lethally poisoned with the radioactive element polonium-210.
By preventing former agents like Skripal and Litvinenko from leaking information, the Kremlin ensures that its secret operations can go on uninterrupted. Ironically, a team responsible for exactly this kind of shadow activity — Unit29155 — was exposed by European intelligence in 2019 within the course of the investigation for another poisoning: that of Emilian Gebrev. The unit was found to have been involved with political disruption activity across Europe for years. They were responsible for a campaign to destabilize Moldova, an attempt to provoke a military coup in Montenegro, and indeed, for the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Sowing chaos in Easter Europe allows Russia to expand its influence there, making it easier to pursue its foreign political and economic goals — for example, the development of Gazprom pipelines. This falls in line with Putin’s extensive strategy of “actively fighting the West” and establishing Russia as a global power. It includes a combination of direct military confrontations, spreading disinformation, cyber warfare, and propaganda.
Gebrev’s case itself reveals another way Russia utilizes its poisonous arsenal. Emilian Gebrev is a Bulgarian arms manufacturer who had been dealing ammunition to Ukraine. In 2015 Gebrev, his son, and his CEO were poisoned before a gala dinner with clients. It is suspected that this poisoning may have been an attempt to prevent the businessman from supplying Ukraine — the enemy — with firepower. The conflict between the two countries was heightened in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The annexation is an example of Putin’s foreign policy, which aims to achieve national security through expansion — a legacy from Stalin, who regarded Eastern Europe as a “buffer” between the West and Russia.
Russia’s poisonous streak is a cautionary tale. Putin’s regime seems dedicated to reinforce its authority through the means of chemical warfare. From staying in power, due to the corruption and lack of democracy, he and his regime gain not only an inordinate amount of wealth but also control over domestic and international affairs. This is why they seek to poison former agents who know too much, businessmen who intrude on inconvenient markets, and perhaps most desperately — directly trying to eliminate the leader of the opposition. Much to their dismay, Navalny’s campaign has actually reaped success in the September 13th election — his associates had deprived Putin’s party United Russia of a tenth of its seats. This, naturally, is not an overwhelming score, but it does send the message that Putin’s majority can be stolen. Most significantly, it gives the people of Russia hope, which is why Navalny and the movement he has sparked are so dangerous. As the stakes rise for the Kremlin, it is safe to assume that the severity of its efforts to stay in power will grow as well. Respectively, so will the casualties.
The sources for the information in this article can be found in the “Bibliography of Bibliographies” page in my profile.
